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Anti-censorship software was originally developed to fi ght 
internet censorship in China. A anti-censorship software such as 
UltraSurf, Freegate, Gpass, GTunnel and FirePhoenix became 
popular with stubborn users who used the Internet for thier own 
purposes and disobeyed the organization’s policies. Statistics 
show that Facebook, and YouTube are ranked as the most popular 
websites used by college students in Malaysia. Since they are 
widely used by users in the local area network to bypass fi rewall 
policies, they have become a threat to the LAN organization. 
Hence, it causes a problem for network administrators who 
manage internet utilisation and enforce internet policies. For an 
organisation, uncontrolled internet usage leads the open system 
to be vulnerably to viruses, backdoor, non-productivity activities 
and slow internet connections. Thus, this study proposes a 
strategy to fi lter and block traffi c created by anti-censorship 
software in LAN. The method used in this project is the “design 
computer security experiment”. Therefore, this project will guide 
the network administrator to control internet utilisation, protect 
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internal organization’s internet policies. As a result, this paper 
has proposed a strategy to block the UltraSurf anti-censorship 
software.The proposed strategy was tested in several public and 
private higher education institutions.
Keywords: Anti-censorship, block traffi c, UltraSurf.
 INTRODUCTION
 Nowadays, computer technologies are changing rapidly. In the organization 
of LAN, to prevent users from accessing restricted websites and conducting 
activities such as downloading movies and software, and accessing 
pornography, Facebook and Twitter websites have a common internet policy. 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) applications such as BitTorrent can steal bandwidth and 
bring with them all kinds of mischievous fi les. Accessing streaming video 
sites such as Youtube.com consumes a lot of bandwidth. University students 
either in public or private education institutions will try to access these entirely 
restricted websites although they have been blocked by the fi rewall. Heavy 
traffi c will slow down the network performance if this restricted website is 
open especially for downloading a movie, facebook or twitter. According to 
Danyaro et al. (2010), Facebook, YouTube and Wikipedia are ranked as the 
most popular websites used by college students. From their study, statistically, 
they estimated that between 32.90% and 43.06% of college students use 
Facebook on a daily basis, compared to YouTube’s 13-22% and Wikipedia’s 
6.87–13.13%. A war between network users and network administrators is 
never-ending. Network administrators will fi nd a way to block and implement 
internet policies to protect the router, fi rewall or proxy to prevent users from 
accessing these restricted websites. However, users will fi nd ways or strategies 
to bypass the fi rewall. According to Aycock & Maurushat (2008), by using 
anti-censorship client software users are able to bypass fi rewall in LAN. There 
many choices of anti-censorship software in the market. According to the 
Global Internet Freedom Consortium (GIFC, 2010), some examples of anti-
censorship software are UltraSurf, Freegate, Gpass, GTunnel and FirePhoenix. 
Internet censorship is a common practice among organizations nowadays. 
According to Wikipedia (2010), censorship is defi ned as “the use of state 
or group power to control freedom of expression, such as passing laws to 
prevent media from being published, propagated and accessed”. However, 
for this study censorship is defi ned as “the use of group power to control 
freedom of accessing web services”. In an organization, the task to implement 
internet censorship is given to the network administrator. The network 
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of the organization. In an organization if users used anti-censorship software 
they can bypass an organization is fi rewall. The network administrator should 
block users who anti-censorship software to bypass fi rewall, and restricted 
access to the website. As a solution, a system is required to ensure the users 
are not able to access restricted websites via anti-censorship software. The 
system should be able to do traffi c analysis and need to be executed at the 
fi rewall level. Normally, the fi rewall is used to reject traffi c requests from 
clients that use anti-censorship software while surfi ng. According to Becchi 
and Crowley (2007), fi rewalls with Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) capabilities 
are able to block traffi c requests from anti-censorship software. Somehow to 
have fi rewall with this DPI capability is expensive for a small organization
  Figure 1.  Anatomy of anti-censorship system.
According to GIFC – white paper, “The ultimate function of an anti-censorship 
system is to connect censored users to the uncensored internet server securely 
and anonymously”. Figure 1 shows how anti-censorship works. That shows 
the general concept of the anti-censorship system step by step. Censored 
users (1) are normal users in LAN or in a country. User-used circumvention-
client software (anti-censorship software) is installed in a censored user’s 
computer. This client software has the ability to connect to the out side and 
also connect to the circumvention tunnels (4). Basically, it uses the tunnel 
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it is connected, the network traffi c automatically is encrypted before being 
connected to the outside by penetrating the GFW (7). Usually the censors (6) 
are not able to detect this kind of traffi c because it is encrypted. Once outside 
the GFW (7), the network traffi c then enters into a circumvention-support 
network (8). This circumvention-support network is set up and operated by 
anti-censorship supporters (9) who have many supporters and setups via many 
infrastructures. The computer in this circumvention-support network (8) acts 
as proxies. Proxies access the content from unstructured internets (10) and 
the target server. The target server then sends the information back to the 
route. The information traffi c does not necessarily take the same route that 
it took to it come. It can be a different route to reach the censored user’s 
computer. Initially if a censored user knows nothing about the other side of 
the GFW, it is necessary to get them bootstrapped by employing out-of-band 
communication channels (5). The channels include emails, telephone calls and 
instant messages. Sometimes users can also take advantage of these channels 
to locate circumvention tunnels (4), if the client software used does not have 
a tunnel discovery agent (3). In fact the most important component in the 
anti-censorship system is the tunnel discovery agent (3). With such an agent, 
a user does not need to confi gure the software. The agent automatically fi nds 
circumvention tunnels for the user. This study carried out a strategy to fi lter 
and block traffi c requests from anti-censorship software which can be used by 
small organizations at an affordable cost.   
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Ultr aSurf became the most common anti-censorship application used in LAN 
to bypass fi rewall. UltraSurf communicates with the target server using the 
external proxy’s server. IP addresses of all external proxies always change. It 
is very hard to do traffi c fi ltering and block the base on each proxy IP address. 
This requires another strategy that is able to do fi ltering and blocking. UltraSurf 
uses port 443 (https) and 80 (http) to communicate from user computer to the 
external proxies server through an organization is fi rewall. Since not many 
fi rewalls are able to fi lter traffi c requests that go through the https protocol, 
fi ltering this traffi c is diffi cult.  Therefore, only the commercial fi rewall 
which is expensive is able to provide fi ltering and blocking https packets. 
These require a solution that is suitable for small organizations to implement, 
which is less expensive and affordable. To create a strategy on how to fi lter 
and block UltraSurf traffi c, transform the network administrator’s ability to 
control internet utilization and carry out the implementation of the internet 
policies. The network administrator also needs to ensure the network is used 
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Anti-censorship software such as UltraSurf, Freegate, Gpass, Garden, 
GTunnel, and FirePhoenix are software that can bypass fi rewall. According 
to Wikipedia (2010), the most common website blocks by fi rewall are 
pornographic, social networks (e.g. Facebook, MySpace and Twitter), political 
blogs, YouTube, Nazi and similar websites and religious websites. User used 
anti-censorship software are used to access some listed categories of websites. 
There are many anti-censorship software in the internet and some of them are 
free to use. According to Global Internet Freedom Consortium, UltraSurf is 
most commonly used (GIFC, 2010) and according to Kaiser (2008) UltraSurf 
is stated as “Possible as The Best Proxy Server, 2008”. 
Recently, UltraSurf has not only been used in China to bypass the “golden 
shield project”, but it also has been used in LAN that applies internet restriction. 
By using UltraSurf, users inside the organization’s LAN are able to bypass the 
fi rewall and access the restricted website.  According to Xia (2004), “UltraSurf 
is extremely diffi cult to block”. UltraSurf uses port 9666 to communicate 
from the web browser to the UltraSurf services, but communication using this 
port is only in local computers. When this port is blocked at the organization, 
fi rewall will not function. UltraSurf uses a secure socket layer (SSL) to 
communicate from the local computer to their proxies. They have thousands 
of proxies, which means blocking IP proxies is not practical. It is impossible 
because from time to time many more IP addresses are being added to the list. 
It also uses port 443 and cannot be blocked at the fi rewall because this port is 
used for https communication. However, if this port is blocked, websites such 
yahoo.com, gmail.com and banking online systems that use this secure socket 
layer to communicate fail to work. 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are fi rewalls that are able to block 
UltraSurf. According to Kumar, Turner, & Williams (2006) and Piyachon & 
Luo (2006), fi lteration can be done by using the SSL interceptor and performing 
DPI (deep packet inspection). Firewalls that have DPI capabilities are able to 
fi lter traffi c that comes from anti-censorship software. This means it is also 
able to block UltraSurf. There are commercial fi rewalls that are able to block 
anti-censorship software, but they are expensive. Examples of fi rewalls that 
have this kind of capability are Sonic Wall and Symantec fi rewall. These types 
of fi rewall are considered expensive for small and medium organizations. For 
this project, the open source solution is preferable since it is free.
According to UltraReach Internet Corp, UltraSurf is one of the most 
successful anti-censorship software in the world. It is a green software, no 
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UltraSurf enables users in countries with heavy Internet censorship to visit 
any public website in the world safely and freely- just the same as using 
the regular IE browser– while it automatically searches the fastest proxy 
servers in the background. It has strong support for load balancing and fault 
tolerance, and it even employs a decoying mechanism to thwart any tracing 
effort of its communication with its infrastructure. UltraSurf has gained large 
popularity among the Internet users, which has daily hits of over 800 million, 
daily traffi c over 8,000 GB, millions of users and users are from over 180 
countries.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The aim of this study is to block traffi c created by UltraSurf from LAN to the 
Internet. In order to achieve the main objective, the specifi c objective has been 
planned as follows:
1. To identify how UltraSurf connects to the Internet.
2. To produce strategy to block traffi c created by UltraSurf. 
3. To evaluate the strategy.
METHODOLOGY
The methodology used seven (7) main phases that were adapted from Peisert 
& Bishop (2007). This methodology has been used for “How to Design 
Computer Security Experiment”.  In this study two phases were added which 
are the “Propose strategy” and the “Validate hypothesis”. These two 
phases were added to suite the study that was conducted.   Figure 2 shows the 
methodology used by Peisert and Bishop.
Instead of UltraSurf, Wireshark was used to capture network traffi c packet. 
According to Gerry (2009) and Vasil (2008), Wireshark is the best free tool 
for protocol analyser. Wireshark has an ability to save captured packet that can 
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   Figure 2. Methodology used in this study.
Figure 3. Example of capture data using wireshark.
Form hypothesis 
Perform experiment and collect data 
Analyse data 
Interprete data and draw conclusion 
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Wireshark was used to monitor all the lines going to and from a computer 
and to track where the packet is going. It was used because for sending and 
receiving replies and also for troubleshooting purposes and optional scenario 
networks for virtual servers and workstations.
EXPERIMENT AND RESULT
Seven phases were conducted in this study and the result for each phase is 
explained. The phases were forming hypothesis, performing experiments and 
collecting data, analysing data, interpreting and drawing conclusions, based 
on the experiment, proposing strategy and validating the hypothesis.
Phase 1: Form Hypothesis
This phase is forming the hypothesis of this study. The hypothesis information 
was obtained from the literature review. To identify the requirement for 
blocking a UltraSurf connection, the processes of web accessing from 
UltraSurf are listed in Table 1. For each process, the location of the connection 
and whether the connection can be controlled by the network administrator 
was identifi ed and labelled as P1, P2, P3 and P4.
Table 1
Process of Connection and the Location it Happened
Label Process of connection Location Ability to 
control by 
network admin
P1 Web browser connected to UltraSurf using localhost (ip 





P2 UltraSurf (discovery agent) connected to various 
external IP (external proxies server) using port https 





P3 External proxies server connected to restricted website 
and passed back to proxies server.
WAN No
P4 Proxies server encrypted (if using port 443) the content 
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Based on Table 1, the requirement to block UltraSurf was identifi ed in the 
second process (P2). This process used port https (443) and http (80) and 
used an organisation gateway to access the Internet. This process happened 
inside an organisation and under supervision of the network administrator. 
In a normal organisation a gateway is used to connect to the Internet as it 
becomes a centre for every computer in LAN. This process is identifi ed as a 
place to study and conduct an experiment, since it is located in the area where 
it is controllable and centralized. As an outcome of this phase, a hypothesis 
“is it possible to block UltraSurf and how does it connect to the Internet” was 
identifi ed.
Phase 2: Perform Experiment and Collect Data.
The second phase carried out the possibilities of creating a simulation to test. 
This phase was to gather information on how UltraSurf connected the Internet 
and all the fi ndings was recorded. The experiment was conducted in four (4) 
conditions and labelled as Exp1, Exp2, Exp3 and Exp4.
Exp1 : Firewall at router blocked specifi c domain name without UltraSurf installed.
Exp2 : Firewall at Squid proxies blocked specifi c domain name without UltraSurf 
installed.
Exp3 : Firewall at router blocked specifi c domain name with UltraSurf installed.
Exp4 : Firewall at Squid proxies blocked specifi c domain name with UltraSurf 
installed.
 
All four (4) experiments were tested using 100 domain names for data 
sampling. The sampling was divided into two sampling domains named 
“Black List Domain” and “White List Domain”. Each sampling contained 
fi fty (50) domain names. The Black List Domain was entered into the fi rewall 
to block connection requests from clients. The experiment was done in public 
and private higher education institution in different locations.  
  Figure 4. A browser message block a blacklist domain.
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Figure 4 shows a message from a browser that blocked a Facebook and 
YouTube websites (blacklist websites). This website data was accessed in 
different locations without UltraSurf installed.
Phase 3. Analyse Data.
In this phase, the result of each experiment was captured and is shown in 
Table 2. Figure 5 shows that the Black List Domain (facebook.com) could 
be accessed with UltraSurf installed although it was blocked by the fi rewall 
before the proposed strategy was applied.
  Figure 5. Successful connection using UltraSurf.
Table 2
Result of Experiment
Domain Name Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4
White List Domain Yes Yes Yes Yes
Black List Domain No No Yes Yes
Table 2 shows that in Exp3 and Exp4 those clients installed with UltraSurf 
were able to access the Black List Domain. It means that the connection 
through UltraSulf could bypass the fi rewall either by fi ltering at the router or 
the proxy.  During Exp3 and Exp4, Wireshark software was used to capture 
the packet that transmited and received data at the client site. This provided 
data that could be used in future. Various versions of UltraSurf were used in 
order to get accurate data. Table 3 shows the summary of the data captured by 
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Table 3 
Summary of Packet in Exp3 and Exp4 using Different Versions of UltraSurf
No Version
Discovery agent in UltraSurf trying to connect using
Port External Proxies IP address




59.106.108.86,  209.85.171.115, 
210.59.144.3,  91.192.128.34












The result shows that UltraSurf used many external proxies IP address in order 
to bypass the local fi rewall. These proxies are impossible to be confi gured 
manually (using IP address) by the network administrator since UltraSurf will 
connect with various external proxies to bypass the fi rewall. It also shows that 
different versions of UltraSurf were connected to different external proxies. 
Phase 4: Interpret and Draw Conclusion
In this phase, it was proved that it was possible to block traffi c created by 
UltraSurf as shown in the previous phase. The connection used http and 
https ports to communicate with outside servers and UltraSurf used various 
IP that became UltraSurf external proxies. This phase suggests that blocking 
communication through IP, will block UltraSurf connection. In this phase 
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Phase 5: Conclusion based on the Experiment 
Based on the outcome of phase 4, a conclusion can be drawn. It supports and 
agrees with the hypothesis of this study. The analysis of the captured packet 
in Table 3 shows that:
1. UltraSurf is connected to various external IP addresses.
2. The connection used port 80 (http) and port 443 (https).
3. It used TCP protocol for communication. 
The results also shows that different versions of UltraSurf are connected to 
different external proxy IP addresses. For example, UltraSurf version 9.4 was 
connected to a different external proxy IP address which was impossible for 
the network administrator to block the various IP address.
Phase 6: Propose Strategy
    
Based on the result of the experiment, this phase exposes a strategy on how 
to fi lter and block UltraSurf. All the captured packet generated by Wireshark 
was analysed. As an outcome from the previous phase, one strategy has been 
established which is: “To reject ALL traffi c using TCP protocol port 80 and 
port 443 that try to connect based on IP address”. This is shown in Figure 6. 
The client PC installed with or without UltraSurf would access the Internet 
through the router or the fi rewall. The Black List Domain was rejected at the 
router/fi rewall and tried to access through the Squid proxy via port 80/443. 
However, by using the proposed system, all Black List Domains were rejected 
at the Squid proxy level. This is because UltraSurf was encrypting the domain 
to an IP address. This IP address was rejected by the Squid proxy that blocked 
all http using the IP address. 
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Tables 3 shows UltraSurf using port 80 and 443 to bypass the fi rewall. Exp3 
and Exp4 also show that clients installed with UltraSurf are able to bypass 
the router fi rewall and the proxies fi rewall. In order to block the restricted 
website, the server in Squid proxy server was confi gured as follows:
acl blacklist_domain_contain url_regex -i 
“/etc/squid/blacklist_domains_contain.acl”
acl blacklist_domain dstdomain “/etc/squid/blacklist_domain.acl”









In Figure 7, the important squid parameter is “acl access_by_ip url_regex 
\b(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-
9]?)\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9]
[0-9]?)\b”. Parameter “http_access deny access_by_ip“ was used to fi lter all 
http and https access. This mean squid will deny the users that try to access 
http and https using the IP address as URL.
  Figure 8. Blacklist_domains.acl.
  Figure 9. Blacklist_domains_contain.acl.
.bigfishgames.com   
.roadandtrack.com 
.sex.com                   .youtube.com 
.facebook.com      .mediafire.com 
.friendster.com      .twitter.com 
.myspace.com          .rapidshare.com 
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Figure 8 and Figure 9 show additional fi les to support squid to block specifi c 
domains and any domain containing specifi c words in their domain names. In 
this phase objective 2 “To produce a strategy that is able to block UltraSurf” 
has been achieved.
Phase 7: Validate the Hypothesis
In this phase, the strategy has been applied into an organisation fi rewall and 
the effect has been analysed to prove whether the strategy is working or not. 
Based on the proposed strategy, Exp4 (web fi ltering at squid with UltraSurf 
installed) was conducted again to validate the requirement needed as shown in 
Table 4. Experiment 3 was not conducted in this study due to a few constraints. 
However it will be continued in the next study.
Table 4
Validate Result
Domain Name Exp1 Exp2 Exp3 Exp4
White List Domain Yes Yes - Yes
Black List Domain No No - No
  Figure 10. UltraSurf unable to connect to Internet.
Figure 10 shows that UltraSurf is unable to connect to the external IP after the 
proposed acl confi guration has been applied. All White List and Black List 
Domains cannot be accessed by users even though UltraSurf was installed 
in their PCs. This shows that a user PC installed with UltraSurf is unable 
to access the Internet. Since this strategy cannot be applied inside the router 
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Table 5 
The Result Before and After Implement the Proposed Strategy (with UltraSurf 
installed)
Before confi guring the 
proposed strategy
After confi guring the 
proposed strategy
Domain Name Exp1 Exp2 Exp4 Exp1 Exp2 Exp4
White List √ √ √ √ √ √
Black List √ √ √ χ χ χ
√ can access the website  χ cannot access the website
Table 5 shows the result before and after confi guring the proposed strategy 
with UltraSurf installed. The entire Black List Domain cannot be accessed by 
the user although the user PC was installed with UltraSurf. 
CONCLUSION
While the experiment was conducted, most of the fi rewall was unable to 
block anti-censorship software such as UltraSurf. A strategy to combat anti-
censorship should be introduced to protect the organization. This project has 
introduced a strategy to block users from accessing prohibited websites.  Squid 
proxy server has an ability to provide a blocking IP address based on the http 
and https connections. Based on this study two techniques of implementation 
are proposed as shown in Figures 11 and 12.
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  Figure 12. Independent proxy.
Figure 11 shows the strategy to implement restriction in accessing the website 
in a single box. This box acts as the router/fi rewall and proxies.  Figure 12 
is proposed since this strategy used squid to fi lter and block the restricted 
website. Based on Experiment 3 (fi rewall at router blocked specifi c domain 
name with UltraSurf installed). This strategy cannot be applied directly in 
a router or a fi rewall. However, as shown in Figure 12, this strategy was 
applied outside a router/fi rewall to fi lter and block UltraSurf. The key for this 
strategy is “To reject ALL traffi c using TCP protocol port 80 and 443 that try 
to connect based on IP address”.  This means if a user tries to connect to the 
Internet using http or https he/she must use the domain name. If the user uses 
the IP address, Squid will drop this network traffi c request. Squid is also able 
to confi gure whether to allow connections using specifi c IP addresses. Squid 
as proxy’s server plays a vital role in this strategy.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
This strategy of blocking UltraSurf traffi c requests can be enhanced in 
many ways and there will always be new developments evolved in this anti-
censorship technology. This reveals the new areas for researchers to explore. 
The following entries will briefl y present further enhanced specifi cations such 
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i. Performance. 
 This research study did not touch on performance to process the fi ltering 
traffi c request. For example, what would happen if 1000 users requested 
at the same time. Is the Squid server able to support and what is the best 
hardware specifi cation to handle connections effi ciently?
ii. Squid new technology.
 The Squid proxy servers keep updating their features to meet the users’ 
targets. The question Are current squid confi gurations (Squid.conf) 
working perfectly in all versions of squid need to be answered.
iii. Network model.
 In this project, traffi c fi ltration is a key to block UltraSurf traffi c. Due 
to time constrain, only squid has be studied to provide traffi c fi ltering. 
IPTables also can provide traffi c fi ltering. How to use the same concept 
can be applied at the IPTables phase.
iv. Others types of anti-censorship software
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are many anti-censorship software 
available in the market. The software are UltraSurf, Freegate, Gpass, 
GTunnel and FirePhoenix. In these study only UltraSurf has been 
tested. The same strategy may work on other anti-censorship software 
as well.
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